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 3 
INTRODUCTION 
 
“A critique does not consist in saying that things aren't good the way they are. It consists in 
seeing on just what type of assumptions, of familiar notions, of established and unexamined 
ways of thinking the accepted practices are based […] To do criticism is to make harder those 
acts which are now too easy.” (Foucault 1994) 
 
This is a quote by Michel Foucault (ibid), who argues that it is important to be critical to 
assumptions and familiar notions that affect our way of thinking and seeing the world. 
Discourses and paradigms affect the way we understand and look at the world we live in. 
They can be seen as invisible boundaries that influence the way we see and understand certain 
events in international politics. Like discourses and paradigms, international relations theories 
offer us a certain lens through which we view the world and understand events within the 
world. Whereas theories can help us to understand certain events, to predict behaviour of 
states and to view events in a broader perspective, it is important to keep in mind that theories 
can also obstruct our understanding of the world. Theories can force us to view the world 
through a certain perspective, which makes our understanding of the world limited and 
restricted. Therefore, it is important to be aware of the paradigms, discourses and theories that 
influence and obstruct our way of understanding the world. Furthermore, it can be helpful to 
see things from a different perspective, by being critical towards dominant discourses and 
mainstream theories.  
Apart from theories and discourses, events can also influence our way of 
understanding the world. One of the events in international politics that has strongly affected 
our way of understanding the world we live in is the Cold War. The Cold War had a massive 
influence on world politics. Scholars spoke of a bipolar world, in which the United States and 
the Soviet Union were the two most influential powers that dominated world politics (Nye 
2011: 73). However, even after the fall of the Soviet Union, Cold War patterns of thinking 
were still visible. The relationship between the United States and Russia is often still 
described from this paradigm. Sawka (2008: 241) argues that “the category of Cold War 
remains so stubbornly entrenched in our understanding of international politics in general, and 
in relations with Russia in particular”. This Cold War paradigm is mainly based on realist 
assumptions that we live in an anarchic world; in which there is no higher authority; that 
states are responsible for their own security; and that states try to balance the power of other 
states by establishing alliances with other states. When Putin came to power, this Cold War 
paradigm became even more dominant. Russia‟s domestic and foreign policy were often 
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described from a realist perspective. Russia‟s policies under Putin are often described from a 
framework of realpolitik, based on power and material factors (ibid, 241-242). Although 
Putin himself seems to reinforce this idea, by forming alliances with states and acting 
confrontational towards other states, it is useful to critically analyse the Russian policies 
under Putin. Another perspective on Russia‟s policies can change the way we understand 
international politics, and it can raise questions on how policy makers, presidents and the 
media understand and react to events in world politics.  
 A theory that can give us another perspective of the world we live in is the 
constructivist theory. Although constructivism, like realism, takes the state as the centre of its 
research, constructivism offers different insights in world politics. By analysing Russia‟s 
policies through both theories, this research tries to offer new ways of understanding Russia 
under Putin and how Russia positions itself in world politics. This paper will focus on 
Russia‟s policies under Putin, because Putin made several policy changes in Russia on both a 
domestic and international level. These policy changes raised questions about how to 
understand Russian politics and position in the world. Whereas these policy changes are often 
explained through a realist lens, constructivism can offer new insights. Furthermore, this 
paper will focus on Russia‟s policies towards the Middle East, because the Middle East can be 
seen as a cockpit of confrontation in international politics between states. Events in the 
Middle East are often viewed from a realist perspective, which makes it interesting to shine a 
different light on the events in the Middle East. Consequently, the research question of this 
paper will be; “What does Russia‟s position in the Middle East under Putin reveal about how 
Russia positions itself in the world.” However, there are a few limitations to this research. 
Due to the scope of the paper, it will focus on Russia‟s foreign policy towards Syria as a Case 
Study. Furthermore, because of a language constraint, Russia‟s foreign policy under Putin 
will be analysed by focusing on English sources. The goal of this paper is to give a new way 
of understanding Russia‟s policies towards the Middle East and how Russia tries to position 
itself in world politics. The first chapter will focus on the debate between (neo-)realism and 
constructivism. The second chapter will focus on the Russian policies towards the Middle 
East. And the last chapter will go deeper into Russia‟s policies towards Syria.  
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THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK 
 
Introduction 
The relationship between states in international politics has been a fundamental subject of 
discussion in the field of International Relations throughout the years. Several International 
Relations theories are built around different ideas of how states behave and interact on the 
world stage. Realism (and later neo-realism) has become one of the most dominant theories in 
the field of International relations. Realist scholars take the state as the centre of their 
research, and see the (sovereign) state as the most influential actor on the world stage. 
Political leaders and media tend to describe the world we live in through a realist lens. 
However, critical notes to the realist theory have arisen. This has led to new International 
Relations theories, and new ways to view the world. One of the theories that have a different 
view on the world we live in is the constructivist theory. The constructivist theory offers new 
insights in the relationships between states. Constructivism arose as a reaction to the (at that 
time) leading neo-realist theory. In order to get a better understanding of the debate between 
neo-realism and constructivism in the field of International Relations, it is first useful to go 
deeper into the key elements of realism. Although there is a lot of discussion among (neo-
)realist scholars on different topics, the scope of this paper does not make it possible to go 
deeper into this discussion. This chapter will therefore focus on the main features of the (neo-
)realist and the constructivist theory.  
  
Realism in International Relations 
Realism is one of the most dominant theories in the field of International Relations. Between 
the 1930s and the 1940s realism became a prominent theory in the field of International 
Relations (Schmidt 2011: 86). Furthermore, Schmidt (ibid) states that from 1939 to today, the 
majority of policy-makers and leading theorists see the world through a realist lens. Realism 
focuses on state interests of states rather than on ideology (ibid). Schmidt explains that 
realism is based on the doctrine of the raison d’état. The main focus of this doctrine is on the 
security of the state. According to this doctrine, the state must pursue power in order to 
guarantee the security of the state. Instead of focussing on morals and ethics in international 
politics, realism focuses on self-interests of states and argues that internationally, states and 
state leaders must distance themselves from traditional morality in order to guarantee the 
security of the state.  
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The following core elements on which realism is based need further explanation: 
statism, anarchy, self-help and power. Statism is “the idea of the state as the legitimate 
representative of the collective will of the people” (Schmidt 2011: 87). Domestically, statism 
makes it legitimate for the state to exercise authority within its borders. Internationally, 
realists argue that there exists anarchy. Realists see anarchy as the basic structure of 
international politics, in which the “independent sovereign states considers itself to be its own 
highest authority and does not recognize a higher power” (ibid).  Within this anarchy, there is 
no central authority. This makes self-help the principle of action in international politics for 
realists. Self-help is the idea that every state is responsible for its own survival, security and 
well-being. If a state feels threatened or is anxious to lose its sovereignty, it is dependent on 
its own power capabilities.  
The relationship between states in international politics is often analysed through 
power relations. The power of states and power relations between states are core elements of 
realism (Schmidt 2011: 86-88). Joseph Nye (1990: 177) states that “leaders and analysts try to 
understand the dynamics of major changes in the distribution of power among states”. Nye 
(1990: 177) gives the following definition of power: “power is the ability to achieve one‟s 
purposes or goals.” On the one hand, Nye (1990: 178) argues that power is often measured by 
the “possession of resources” of a state. However, he argues that it is not easy to measure 
resources, and to determine which resources are most powerful in any particular context. 
Furthermore, he (Nye 1990: 179-180) argues that the sources of power have changed over 
time.  
 
Balance of Power 
The term balance of power is often used in the field of International Relations -and by 
political leaders- to explain and predict the behaviour of states. The term has been a basic 
assumption of how realists interpret international politics (Nye 1990: 184). According to 
Schmidt (2011: 88) the most common definition of the term is the following: “If the survival 
of a state or a number of weaker states is threatened by a hegemonic state or coalition of 
stronger states, they should join forces establish a formal alliance, and seek to preserve their 
own independence by checking power of the opposing side.”  
Nye (1990: 184) argues that the term balance of power is based on two realistic 
assumptions of international politics. The first one is that the states live in a structure of 
anarchy. The second assumption of the idea of balance of power, is that political leaders main 
goal is to guarantee the safety of their state and that they will try to reduce the risks that might 
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threaten the independence of their states. Schmidt‟s (2011: 88) definition of balance of power 
focuses on the use of the term for practical purposes. In this case, political leaders use the 
term balance of power, to create a foreign policy and to predict the policy of other states.  
 
The Rise of Constructivism 
In the last twenty years, constructivism has become one of the most important theories in the 
field of International Relations. In the 1980s, neo-realism and neo-liberalism were the leading 
theories in the field of International Relations. Constructivism arose as a critical reaction to 
these two mainstream theories, and to neo-realism in particular. Although both constructivism 
and neo-realism take the state as the centre of their research, there are crucial differences 
between the two theories in understanding and researching the world we live in. Instead of 
taking the interests of states as fixed, constructivist scholars focus on the impact of ideas, 
knowledge, norms and rules on the identities and interests of states (Barnett: 2011). 
Constructivism is based on three claims: “(1) states are the principal units of analysis for 
international political theory; (2) the key structures in the states system are intersubjective, 
rather than material; and (3) state identities and interests are in important part constructed by 
these social structures, rather than given exogenously to the system by human nature or 
domestic politics” (Wendt 1994: 385). 
Neo-realism is a contemporary or modern form of realism (Lamy 2011: 117). One of 
the most important neo-realist scholars is Kenneth Waltz. His theory of structural realism is 
one of the various versions of neo-realism (1959). Alexander Wendt‟s (1992) article „Anarchy 
is What States Make of it‟ gives a critical constructivist reaction to Waltz structural realism. 
This paper will go deeper into the main features of both constructivism and neo-realism. Its 
main focus will be on the ideas of Waltz and Wendt.  
 
Structure/Agency Debate  
One of the essential differences between constructivism and neo-realism is how both theories 
define structure. One of the progenitors of neo-realism, Kenneth Waltz argues in Man, the 
State and War (1959), that the structure of the international system consists of three basic 
elements, which are interconnected. The first element is the anarchic nature of the 
international system. This anarchy leads according to Waltz (1959) to a self-help system, in 
which every state is responsible for its own security. This then leads to the distribution of 
power (ibid). According to Waltz (1959) states act the way they do -aggressive and 
suspicious-, because the structure forces the states to do so. Within this fixed structure Waltz 
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(ibid) describes, individualism and materialism play an important role. Barnett (2011: 151) 
explains individualism as “the view that actors have fixed interests and that the structure that 
constrains their behaviour derives from the aggregation of the properties of those actors.” 
Furthermore he (ibid) explains materialism as “the view that the structure that constrains their 
behaviour is defined by distribution of power, technology, and geography.” Neo-realists take 
identities and interests of agents (states) as given and the structure in which states behave as 
fixed. Waltz (1979) argues that the „balance of power‟ is one of the main components of this 
fixed structure.  
 Constructivists do not agree with this neorealist analysis of the structure of the world 
system. Whereas neo-realism defines the international structure in material terms, and sees 
this structure as a constraint on states, constructivists focus on normative structure (Barnett 
2011: 163). Instead of focussing on individualism and materialism in defining the 
international structure, normative structure focuses on collectively held ideas such as 
“knowledge, rules, beliefs, and norms”(ibid). These ideas do not only constrain states, but 
they also construct the interests and identities of states (Wendt 1992). Ideas are not fixed, and 
if these ideas change, the structure can also change. Furthermore, Wendt argues that structure 
is endogenous to process and interaction between states, and is therefore socially constructed 
(ibid).  
 Furthermore, Wendt (1992: 395) argues that the structure we find ourselves in is not 
fixed, but socially constructed. In „Constructing International Politics‟ Wendt (1995: 73) 
argues that social structures are based on three elements. First, social structures are defined by 
“shared understandings, expectations, or knowledge”, on which the relationships between 
states are based (ibid). Second, Wendt argues that social structures include material resources. 
However, these material resources only affect human actions “through the structure of shared 
knowledge in which they are embedded” (ibid). Third, Wendt argues that social structure only 
exists in process. He gives the Cold War as an example of how shared knowledge influences 
states and how this process can stop immediately when states share a „new‟ knowledge (ibid).  
Wendt does not agree with Waltz‟s three elements that define structure in the 
international system. Although Wendt (1992) does not deny that we live in an anarchic world, 
he (ibid: 194) argues that “self-help and power politics do not follow either logically or 
causally from anarchy and that if today we find ourselves in a self-help world, this is due to 
process, not structure.” According to Wendt, Waltz‟s explanation does not predict much about 
the behaviour of states. For example, it does not show us whether states will be allies or not, if 
they will recognize the sovereignty of one another (Wendt 1992: 396). The main difference 
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between neo-realists and constructivist on the matter of structure is therefore that the neo-
realist see the structure of the world as fixed, whereas constructivists see the structure as 
socially constructed and agents can possibly even transform structures through interaction. 
Furthermore, neo-realists give less agency to actors in the world system, because they believe 
that these actors have to act in a fixed structure. Contrary, constructivists believe that 
interaction between states can change the structure, which gives actors more agency.  
 
Interest/Identity Formation 
Another key difference between neo-realism and constructivism is how both theories 
approach identities and interests of states in world politics. Neo-realists see domestic and 
factors as the most important determinants of the identities and interests of states. These 
domestic identities do not change over time, but are „genetic‟. Therefore, neo-realists see the 
identities and interests of states as fixed. On the other hand, constructivists argue that 
systemic interaction is equally important in the construction of identities and interests of 
states (Wendt 1992: 423). According to Wendt (1992: 398) interests of states define their 
behaviour. He argues that identities are the basis of these interests. Furthermore, in order to 
know what we want, we first have to know who we are (Barnett 2011: 163). These interests 
are not fixed, and they depend on the social context and the process of defining situations. 
Identities are not fixed, because they are produced through interaction and they are socially 
constructed (ibid). Wendt (1992: 398-399) argues that roles can define interests. For example 
the role of a state in the international society can define its interests. Contrary, the absence of 
a role can lead to identity confusion and can make it difficult to define interests.  
 Furthermore, Wendt (1992) argues that identities are based on self-other relations. In 
order to know who „we‟ are, the „other‟ has to be defined. Both the image of the „other‟ and 
the „self‟ are constructed and not fixed. In a world in which anarchy exists, identity formation 
is most concerned with the security of the „self‟. However, the security of a state depends on 
how a state sees the „self‟ in relationship to the „other‟. According to Wendt (1992: 400) this 
can lead to a self-help system, but also to a system in which states cooperate in order to 
generate security for all states. How states than act in world politics depends on social 
relationship between states. The anarchic nature of the world-system and the self-help system 
to which this leads is according to Wendt (ibid, 410) not a fixed structure. Instead, he (ibid) 
argues it is “far from being exogenously given, the intersubjective knowledge that constitutes 
competitive identities and interests is constructed every day by processes of “social will 
formation” […] is what states have made of themselves”. 
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Wendt (1992: 405) argues that the interaction between states depends on a “social 
act”. He argues that the “process of signaling, interpreting, and responding completes a 
“social act” and begins the process of creating intersubjective meanings.” Furthermore, this 
social act creates expectation on both sides of how the other will behave. The „self‟ will act 
based on these expectations. The interaction between the „self‟ and the „other‟ will create 
certain ideas that will probably be confirmed. This can lead to relatively stable concepts of the 
„self‟ and the „other‟ in the interaction between two actors. Within this relatively stable social 
structure, we then define our interests and identities. It is important to note that identities and 
interests of states are relationship-specific. Moreover, Wendt (1992: 409) argues that “states 
may be competitive in some relationships and solidary in others”. Although this structure can 
change over time, the structure is relatively stable. According to Wendt (1992: 423) the 
stability of the structure and identities and interests of states is what makes the realist and 
rationalist discourse reasonable. 
 
Conclusion 
Although both constructivism and neo-realism take the state as the centre of their research, 
they have different ideas on how states behave and interact in the world system. First, 
whereas neo-realism focuses on nature, constructivism focuses on nurture. By focusing on 
nature, neo-realists believe in a fixed structure that constrains actors within this structure. 
Furthermore, they believe that genetic and domestic factors are the most important 
determinants for the identity and interests of states. Contrary, constructivists focus on nurture. 
In other words, they see the structure as not fixed, which does not only constrain actors but 
also constructs them. Furthermore, identities and interests are according to constructivists 
socially constructed. 
 Second, neo-realists focus on materialism, and constructivists on idealism. For 
example, realists see power as the ability of one state to influence another state to do what it 
would otherwise not do. It focuses mainly on material resources that give a state power. 
Constructivists see power as more than material, and argue that power can also have an 
ideational meaning. On the one hand, the power of a state can also be measured in legitimacy. 
States need legitimacy of the international community to make their policies succeed. Barnett 
(2011: 157) explains that “the greater the legitimacy, the easier time they will have 
convincing others other to cooperate with their policies; the lesser legitimacy, the more costly 
the action.” On the other hand, according to constructivists, power includes “how knowledge, 
the fixing of meanings, and the construction of identities allocate differential rewards and 
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capacities” (ibid). If a state wants to get what it wants, the image that state has in the 
international community is important.  
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RUSSIA’S POSITION IN THE MIDDLE EAST 
Introduction 
Constructivism and realism offer lenses through which world politics can be viewed. State 
behaviour and interaction between states can be understood in a different way through these 
theories. A region that has been a centre of state interaction throughout history is the Middle 
East. In order to get a better understanding of how state interaction and behaviour can be 
understood through the constructivist and realist theory, the Middle East is an interesting 
region to research. Kreutz (2007: 5) argues that the centre of tension between great powers is 
focused in the Middle East, because “it is located in one of the most central point in Eurasia, 
its enormous energy resources, and its political instability.” In order to understand how Russia 
positions itself in world politics, it is therefore interesting to take a closer look at Russia‟s 
position in the Middle East.  
Russia has a long history of economic, political and geographical involvement in the 
Middle East. The Middle East is a close neighbour of Russia and Russia has strong and 
diverse ties with the different countries in the Middle East. However, Russia‟s involvement in 
the Middle East changed over time. Russia‟s domestic situation and its position in the world 
influenced its involvement in the Middle East. The involvement of Russia in the Middle East 
has changed a lot from the Soviet period during the Cold War to its involvement nowadays.  
 Putin‟s foreign policy towards the Middle East is often described from a realist 
perspective. Since Putin came into power, Cold War patterns of thinking became visible again 
in the discussion about how Russia tries to position itself in the world (Sawka 2008: 241). He 
(ibid) argues that the Cold War discourse is still present in our understanding of world 
politics. Dannreuther (2012: 543) calls this discourse the „Cold War Paradigm‟ and argues 
that the media often describe the confrontations between the West and Russia in the Middle 
East through this paradigm. This paradigm is mainly based on realist assumptions of anarchy 
and balance of powers. This makes it interesting to shine a different light on these the 
behaviour of states and the confrontations between states in the Middle East. This chapter will 
focus on Russia‟s position in the Middle East. It will use the realist and constructivist theory 
to get a better understanding of Russia‟s foreign policy towards the Middle East, and how 
Russia tries to position itself in world politics.  
 
Soviet Union in the Middle East 
In order to understand the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, it is important 
to view this involvement in a broader perspective. After the Second World War, there was a 
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state of tension both military and politically between the United States and the Soviet Union. 
This tension had an effect of the general foreign policy of the Soviet Union and its foreign 
policy towards the Middle East in particular. According to Campbell (1978: 4) the foreign 
policy of the Soviet Union towards the Middle East must be seen as part of its global strategy. 
Campbell (1978) argues that the Soviet Union wanted to expand its power and saw the 
Middle East as a logic place to begin. Not only because the geographical position, close to the 
boarder of the Soviet Union, at the centre of three circles “the Arab, the Islamic and the 
African” (Campell 1978: 4), but also because presence and the conflicting interests of the 
West in that region. Furthermore, the conflicts in the Middle East offered a change for the 
Soviet Union to pursue interests. 
 The Soviet Union tried to gain influence at an economic, political and ideological 
level. The Soviet Union cooperated with governments and national liberation movements in 
the Middle East in order to become a stronger power in the region. Campell (1978: 5) 
explains the involvement of the Soviet Union by arguing that the Soviet Union “build, piece 
by piece, a security system in which those states which join will have their security 
guaranteed by, and dependent on, the Soviet Union. Political and social change will be 
encouraged in emancipated Middle East states in the direction of socialism on the Soviet 
model, thus establishing a firm basis for their staying tied to the Soviet alignment.” Although 
the Soviet Union tried to build close relationships with Syria, Iraq, Libya and Sudan and the 
Palestinian Authority, several factors made its presence in the Middle East difficult. The 
Soviet Union did not always want to take position against Israel and support the aims of their 
Arab partners. Furthermore, there were conflicts between there allies, because of diverging 
interests. And the economic interests of the oil producers in the Middle East drew them to the 
West (Campell 1978: 6). Whereas the influence of the Soviet Union was at its highest point 
between 1950 and 1960 (Kreutz 2007: 3), its influence decreased as the Soviet Union became 
domestically weaker. Kreutz (ibid) argues that “the First Gulf War and the Madrid Peace 
Conference in 1991 marked the end of the Soviet‟s active role in the Arab World.” 
 By viewing the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, it seems 
logical to explain it from a realist perspective. The Soviet Union‟s efforts to build strong 
relationships with several Middle Eastern countries could be easily explained through the 
framework of „balance of power‟. Furthermore, in the Cold War, the West and the East tried 
to balance the power of each other by creating alliances with other countries, to create 
security of „the self‟. Viewed form a realist perspective, it is logical that the Soviet Union 
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tried to create these alliances with material factor. The Soviet Union made several Middle 
Eastern countries dependent on a military and political level. 
 Although this realist perspective is highly reasonable, it gives a limited 
understanding of the Soviet Union‟s involvement in the Middle East. It does not pay attention 
to the ideological involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East, and the effort of the 
Soviet Union to guide Middle Eastern countries to the social model of the Soviet Union. From 
a constructivist perspective, the involvement of the Soviet Union in the Middle East can be 
understood as part of the social constructed bi-polar structure of the Cold War. The 
relationship between the United States changed after the Second World War, which affected 
the interests of the Soviet Union in the Middle East. Furthermore, the changed role of the 
Soviet Union as one of the two major powers in the world changed its identity and therefore 
its interest in the Middle East. From a constructivist perspective, the ideological involvement 
of the Soviet Union could be explained as part of a social construction of power politics, 
played by the Soviet Union (Wendt 1992: 403).  
 
Russia’s Declining Power in the Middle East during Yeltsin’s Presidency 
This constructivist idea that a role of a state effects its identity and interests, and that this role 
can change, becomes clearer after viewing Yeltsin‟s foreign policy towards the Middle East. 
The Soviet Union focused on increasing its influence in world politics, and tried to increase 
its influence in the Middle East. Contrary, after the fall of the Soviet Union, Yeltsin had to 
search for Russia‟s new role on both a domestic level and in international politics. It can be 
stated that Russia was going through a period of identity confusion during Yelstin‟s 
presidency. Stent (2008: 1091) argues that there were two movements in the Russian 
government. One movement wanted Russia to follow a unique Eurasian path, and develop an 
independent state system, and another movement that wanted to follow the lead of the West 
and eventually integrate with the West. The Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East 
was market a weak independent strategy (ibid). On the one hand, Russian oligarchs played an 
independent political and economical role in the Middle East. These oligarchs could operate 
independently from the Russian state (Kreutz 2007: 3). The fact that these oligarchs were very 
influential in different Middle Eastern countries, made it difficult for Yeltsin to pursue a 
Russian independent foreign policy towards the Middle East. On the other hand, Yeltsin‟s 
advisors “were predominately neoliberal and Western in orientation” (Kreutz 2007: 4). Andrei 
Kozyrev was the first Russian minister of foreign affairs, and promoter of this pro-Western 
foreign policy. According to him, Russia needed to break with its Soviet past and join the 
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Western civilized world (ibid). Yevgeny Primakov replaced Kozyrev in 1995, who was less 
pro-Western, and wanted to restore Russia‟s power and position in the world and in particular 
in the Middle East (ibid). However, Russia was still in crisis and was highly dependent of the 
West. The United States and Europe were Russia‟s principal donors (Rumer 2007: 14). This 
made it impossible for Russia to act as an independent power and forced Russia to follow the 
lead of the West. Russia could not pursue an independent strategy towards the Middle East, 
but had to follow the lead of the West. 
 Whereas realist and neo-realist claim that structures, identities and interests of states 
are fixed, the fall of the Soviet Union followed by Yeltsin‟s presidency seem to indicate the 
opposite. The world order changed from a bi-polar world, to a unipolar world in which the 
United States was the strongest power in international politics (Nye 2011: 73). This changed 
structure had an influence on Russia‟s influence in the Middle East. Yeltsin was forced to 
follow the lead of the United States on the world stage, and in the Middle East. Therefore, it 
can be stated that the changed relation between „the self‟ (Russia) and „the other‟ (the United 
States). Wendt (1992: 389-399) argues that “the absence or failure of roles makes defining 
situations and interests more difficult, and identity confusion may result.” Furthermore, he 
(ibid) argues that after the Cold War, the former Soviet Union and the United States entered a 
period of identity confusion, in which both states were unsure of what their interests were.    
 
Putin Sets New Foreign Policy Goals for Russia 
The end of the Cold War seemed the end of the bipolar structure. However, since Putin 
became the president of the Russian Federation, Cold War patterns of thinking became visible 
again in the discussion about Russia position in the world (Sakwa 2008: 241). According to 
Sakwa (ibid), the Cold War discourse is still present in our understanding of international 
politics. Therefore, Russia‟s policies and confrontations between Russia and the West are 
often described through this discourse. Dannreuther (2012: 543) calls this discourse the „Cold 
War paradigm‟, and argues that since the Middle East became a cockpit for the confrontations 
between the West and the East, the events in the Middle East are often described through this 
paradigm. Several scholars see Russia‟s renewed interest in the Middle East under Putin as an 
effort to counterweigh the hegemony of the United States in international relations. Freedman 
(2002: 2) for example argues that Russia and Iran work together to what they see as an effort 
of the United States to establish a unipolar world. Furthermore, Russia‟s policy in the Middle 
East, which supports anti-Western forces in the region (such Libya and Syria during the Arab 
Spring), is seen as evidence that the world is heading towards a new Cold War (ibid). 
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However, whereas this Cold War paradigm is based on (neo-)realist ideas of balance of power 
and fixed identities, structures and interests, Putin foreign policy towards the Middle East 
needs further explanation. 
 Whereas Yeltsin followed the lead of the West in international politics, Putin had a 
different idea for Russia in the world. Putin wanted Russia to act as a key player in 
international politics, and he did not want to follow the lead of the West anymore. In order to 
become a strong power on the world stage, Putin focused first on stronger state control. 
During Putin‟s presidency, Russia grew economically stronger, through the sale of arms, the 
rise of oil and gas prices, and by expanding business ties abroad (Freedman: 2002: 1). Its 
economic growth made it possible for Russia to repay its international debts (Rumer 2007: 
24). Putin restored the power of the state, by recentralizing the foreign policy making. Due to 
these domestic changes, Putin was able to follow its independent foreign policy. 
Apart from these political changes, Stent argues that Putin tried to restore Russia‟s 
identity, in order to re-unite the nation (Stent 2008: 1091-1092). He restored “Tsarist and 
Soviet-era symbols of Russian identity” (ibid). Putin redefined the Russian identity as it was 
under the Tsars “as based on the triad of Orthodoxy, Autocracy and Nationality” (ibid). Putin 
emphasized the fact that Russia was different from the West and that Russia would follow its 
own unique path in the world. Putin wanted to show the West that Russia did not want to 
follow the lead of the West anymore in world politics. Furthermore, Vladislav Surkov‟s 
concept of „sovereign democracy‟ became the basis for Russia‟s uniqueness in the world. 
With this term, Russia wanted to show that it sees itself as a democracy, but it wants to be let 
alone and make its own independent choices (Evans 2008: 905). 
Putin‟s focus on these ideological changes in Russia can be explained through a 
constructivist perspective. Constructivists believe that identities and interests of states can be 
constructed and are not fixed. Putin tried to change the Russian identity, so he could pursue 
his interest to become an independent power in international politics. Furthermore, he tried to 
change the world structure, by changing the Russian identity. His goal was to become an 
independent key player in world politics, which he could only pursue creating a strong 
national identity. Putin tried to bring back the identity of the Soviet Union, because during the 
Soviet period, after the Second World War, Russia was one of the two key players in world 
politics. Furthermore, Putin tries to change the unipolar world structure. This effort of Putin to 
change the Russian national identity, goes against the (neo-)realist idea that identities and 
interests are fixed.  
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Putin’s Foreign Policy Towards the Middle East  
Putin was much freer in dealing with foreign policy issues in the Middle East than Yeltsin 
was, due to the elimination of political influence of the oligarchs. Under Putin, Russia‟s 
involvement in the Middle East increased. Russia‟s minister of foreign affairs Sergey Lavrov 
stated in Foreign Policy that “Russia feels more assertive than it has since the Soviet collapse, 
and can now pay more attention to looking after our legitimate interests” (Kenner 2013). 
Putin tried to restore Russia‟s presence in the region, and he tried to intensify Russia‟s 
bilateral relationships with Iran, Syria, Lybia and the Palestinian Authority among others in 
the Middle East (Freedman 2010). Russia‟s presence in the Middle East during Putin‟s 
presidency has different dimensions.  
First of all, Putin wanted Russia to become a great power in international politics. In 
order to become a great power, bilateral relationships with countries in the Middle East were 
of importance to Russia. Close bilateral relationships would give Russia a stronger political 
position in the region and also in the world. Therefore, Putin wanted Russia to become a key 
player in the Middle East. During his presidency, Putin visited Middle Eastern countries 
several times. In 2005, Putin visited Egypt, Israel and the Palestinian Authority (Kreutz 2007: 
7). Kreutz argues that the main goal of this visit was to “show the flag” and to demonstrate 
Russia‟s presence and renewed interest in the area” (ibid). Putin argued that this visit did not 
show a new direction in Russia‟s policy in the region, but instead “it continues past traditions 
and at the same time, it expands our contacts in the region”, and that Russia wanted to make 
an end to the fairly cool relations that the Soviet Union had with for example Saudi Arabia 
and Qatar. Putin wanted to restore its influence in the region. It could be argued that this is 
part of a bigger plan to become a major power in world politics.  
Another reason for Putin‟s renewed interest in the Middle East are economic interests 
in the region. Instead of focusing on domestic economic drivers, Putin had global economic 
ambitions for Russia. Therefore, Putin pursued an economic relationship with each country in 
the Middle East. These economic relationships, include “the consolidation of oil and gas 
resources under Russian State supervision; arms sales to Venezuela, Syria, and Iran” (Kreutz 
2007: 1). Putin used his visits to make deals to cooperate more closely in the area of energy, 
gas and oil with for example Egypt and Syria. Furthermore, Putin stated that Russia wants to 
intensify its military cooperation with the Middle East. (Putin: Kremlin Transcript). 
Third, there are domestic drivers. The Islamic community in Russia is a large minority 
that represents more than 15% of the Russian population (Kreutz 2007: 2). With its 
involvement in the Middle East, Russia tries to “counter the threat of secessionism in the 
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North Caucasus and the potential broader radicalisation of Russia‟s Muslim population” 
(Danneuter 2012: 543).  
  
Tensions Between Russia and the West 
The Middle East has caused tension between states throughout history. Several powers have 
different interests in the Middle East, and try to gain influence in this area. The Middle East 
has often been the centre of confrontation between the United States and Russia, in for 
example the Arab-Israeli conflict. Russia and the United States often had and still have 
opposing interests in the Middle East. (Kreutz 2007: 5). The partnerships of the United States 
and Russia in the Middle East with states that were often in conflict with each other caused 
tensions between the United States and Russia. Russia‟s allies Syria and Iran for example had 
conflicting interests from Israel and Russia supported the Palestinian Authority in several 
peace talks in the Arab-Israeli conflict. Russia supported political leaders in Iran, Iraq and the 
Syria with supply of arms, which was not in the interest of Israel (Freedman 2002). 
Furthermore, Russia‟s bilateral cooperation with Israel declined, while its relationship with 
the Palestinian Authority intensified. The political leaders of Russia‟s allies of Iran, Iraq, 
Syria and the Palestinian Authority often had divergent interest from the United States and its 
allies. Putin‟s effort to intensify Russia‟s relationship with Iran for example “was not received 
well in Israel of the United States” (Freedman 2010: 15). Contrary, the overthrow of Saddam 
Hussein‟s regime in 2003 was not in line with Russia‟s economic interests. His regime owed 
Russia $8 billion dollars, and Russia has strong business ties with Iraq (ibid). Another area of 
tension between the United States and Russia was Iran‟s nuclear program. Although Russia 
was initially helping Iran to build its nuclear plant on Bushehr, the United States wanted 
Russia to end all its support (ibid, p. 19).  
These confrontations between allies has led to the idea of different scholars that 
Russia‟s tries to balance the power of the United States in the Middle East. Freedman (2007) 
for example argues that one of the main reasons of Putin‟s interest in the Middle East is to 
counterbalance the power of the United States in the world. According to him (Freedman 
2010: 11), Putin tries to restore its influence in the region, in which the power of the United 
States is in decline. Cohen (2007) agrees with Freedman and argues that Russia is following 
the Soviet model of the Cold War “by playing to anti-Western sentiment in the “street” and 
among elites.” These are examples of the presence of the Cold War discourse in the 
discussion about Russia role in the Middle East. 
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However, the Middle East should not only be seen as a centre of confrontation 
between the United States and Russia. Although the interests of the United States and Russia 
in the region are clashing in several areas, they also tried to cooperate and to resolve political 
issues in the region. After 9/11 for example, “Moscow not only provided useful intelligence to 
the United States, but also initially raised no objections to the establishment of U.S. bases in 
Central Asia to fight the Taliban and Al Qaeda” (Freedman 2010: 15). However, this 
cooperation came to an end when the United States wanted to go to war. Putin did not support 
unilateral action of the United States without support of the United Nations. Putin stated that 
it would be “a direct violation of international law, and a major political mistake that could 
cause the International Security system to collapse” (Putin: 2003). In 2014, the United States 
and Russia tried to cooperate again on the nuclear issue in Iran. Eventually, they came to a 
deal on Iran‟s nuclear program (Sanger: 2014). It is difficult to explain this cooperation 
through a (neo-)realist perspective. It could be stated that Russia and the United States try to 
cooperate as a way to maintain their power and pursue their interests in the region. However, 
it seems more reasonable to explain it through the constructivist idea that „self‟/„other‟ 
relations can change for example through a change of structure. Whereas the Soviet Union 
and the United States stood against each other in the Cold War, confrontation between Russia 
and the United States is not always in Putin‟s best interest nowadays. 
 
Conclusion 
The Cold War discourse is based on (neo-)realist ideas of how states interact. This discourse 
presumes that we live in a world in which anarchy exist, and that we live in a self-help 
system. Furthermore, it is based on the idea that states can only rely on themselves for their 
own security. The close bilateral relationships of Russia with for example Syria, Lybia and 
Iran are explained through the idea that Russia tries to balance the power of the United States. 
Moreover, Russia wants to balance the power of the United States and it tries to prevent the 
world from becoming a unipolar world in which the United States acts as a hegemon. Within 
this discourse, interests and identities are fixed. The discourse denies the change in structure 
after the fall of the Soviet Union. Therefore, it sees the interest and identity of Russia as the 
same as during the Soviet period. Putin seems to give sustenance to this discourse by using a 
confrontational language in his speeches. He does not only try to restore the Soviet identity of 
Russia, but he also uses confrontational language towards the West. Putin gave a speech at 
Munich Security Conference in 2007, in which he criticized the West, and the United States 
in particular, for making its democracy promotion in the world, for not respecting the norms 
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and laws of the international society, and for acting as a hegemon (Putin: 2007, Munich 
Security Conference). By acting this way, Putin seems to confirm the Cold War discourse. 
 However, Putin foreign policy towards the Middle East can also be understand from a 
constructivist perspective. Whereas the neo-realist discourse gives a good idea of why Putin 
acts as he does, it tends to overlook important issues. The Cold War discourse for example, 
does not pay attention to the period between the fall of the Soviet Union and 2000, when 
Putin became president. This period was marked by a change of the role of both the Soviet 
Union and the United States in the international society. The world was changing from a bi-
polar world to a unipolar world (Nye 2011: 10). The changed role of Russia and changed 
structure of the international society had an effect op Russia‟s identity. Furthermore, Yeltsin‟s 
presidency was marked by identity confusion, which led to a change of Russia‟s interests in 
the world. The power relations between Russia and the United States changed, which also had 
an effect on its role in the world and in the Middle East. Russia‟s role in the world and in the 
Middle East can therefore be seen as a socially constructed role, which leads to a socially 
constructed identity. Furthermore, the Cold War paradigm and the (neo-)realist perspective on 
Putin‟s foreign policy denies the cooperation in several areas between Russia and the United 
States. From a constructivist perspective, the Cold War discourse can also be seen as a 
socially constructed discourse, that keeps the old idea of a bi-polar world structure alive.  
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SYRIA: THE ULTIMATE BALANCE OF POWER? 
Introduction 
This chapter will discuss Russia‟s presence and influence in Syria. Syria has been an ally of 
Russia since the Cold War. Putin has tried to restore Russia‟s bilateral relationship with Syria, 
on an economic and political level. Since the beginning of the Syria Crisis in 2011, Russia has 
supported Bashar al-Assad, even though the United States among other Security Council 
members wanted Assad to leave. Russia, with only the support of China vetoed four United 
Nations Security Council resolutions in favour of Assad. In order to get a better understanding 
of how Putin positions Russia in the world and how both realism and constructivism can be 
used to understand the Russian position, Syria offers an interesting case study. Syria seems 
the ultimate place where power relations between states in international politics become 
visible. Furthermore, viewed from a realist perspective, the confrontation between the West 
and Russia in the Syria Crisis can be understood from the framework of „balance of power‟. 
Within this framework Putin‟s effort to restore Russia‟s bilateral relations with Syria can be 
seen as a way to counterweigh the hegemony of the United States in the region and in the 
world. However, the constructivist approach gives another perspective on Russia‟s role in 
Syria. In this chapter, both theories will be used to get a better understanding of Russia‟s role, 
goals and presence in Syria and in the Syria Crisis.  
 
Soviet and Russian relations with Syria  
Russia has a long history of presence and influence in Syria. Even before Syria was formally 
recognized as an independent sovereign state in 1946, the Soviet Union had already 
established diplomatic links with Syria. The Soviet Union built strong economic and military 
ties with Syria. Between 1956 and 1970, the relationship between the Soviet Union and Syria 
became even closer. The Soviet Union supported Syria both on an economic and political 
level (Kreutz 2007: 12-18). In 1980 “Syria and the USSR signed the Treaty of Friendship and 
Cooperation” (Kreutz 2007: 16). This treaty contained “a rather vague clause that stipulated 
military cooperation and consultation in the case of threat to the peace and security of one of 
the parties […] the USSR promised that it would “respect the policy of non-alignment 
pursued by Syria” (ibid). Although the Soviet Union tried to maintain the strong bilateral 
relationship with Syria, the relationship was complex and both parties had divergent interests 
concerning several issues. According to Kreutz (2007: 17) two major issues of disagreement 
between the Soviet Union and Syria were “the Syrian quest for military parity with Israel and 
the heated debate with Moscow over the quality and quantity of its arms supply, and the 
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second was, the noticeable improvement in Soviet-Israeli relations and mass scale Soviet-
Jewish immigration to Israel.” Although Gorbachev tried to remain close to Syria, and invited 
al-Assad to Moscow, these issues challenged the relationship between the Soviet Union and 
Syria.  
During Yeltsin‟s presidency, Russian-Syrian relations were challenged even more. 
One of the major issues that caused tensions between the two countries was that Syria refused 
to pay its Soviets debts of an estimated $7-11 billion dollar to Russia (ibid, 18-19). This had 
an effect on Russia‟s willingness to sell more arms to Syria. Furthermore, this issue had an 
effect on the relationship between Russia and Syria, and “changed [Syria‟s status] from a 
privileged friend to become a “thorny issue in Russian foreign policy” (Kreutz 2007: 18). 
Although the ties between Russia and Syria remained to exist under Yeltsin, their relationship 
could not be compared to the Soviet-Syrian relationship. The declining presence and 
influence of Russia in Syria during Yeltsin‟s presidency was mainly due to the internal 
weakness, and the international pressure on Russia to follow an agenda in world politics set 
by the West.  
 
Putin’s involvement in Syria 
At first, when Putin came to power, the relationship between Syria and Russia stayed 
relatively weak compared to the Soviet period (Katz 2006: 1). However, Putin‟s main foreign 
policy goal was to become a great power again in international politics (Stent 2008: 1096). 
Putin‟s presence in Syria should therefore be seen in the light of this broader goal of Putin: to 
make Russia a great power. Putin‟s willingness to change the Russian identity is reflected by 
a change in interests. Furthermore, in order to become a great power, Putin redefined the 
Russian interests in the Middle East. He wanted to restore Russia‟s strong bilateral 
relationship with several countries in the Middle East, such as Syria. Putin wanted to 
counterweigh the United States, so that Russia could follow its own interests in international 
politics, and the international community would consider Russia a great power. In order to do 
so, Russia tried to restore its economic prestige, and intensify its economic ties in the Middle 
East.  
Although Putin wanted to restore its relationship with Syria, there were important 
differences between Syria and Russia that made it difficult to cooperate. First, Russia and 
Syria had different ideas on how to resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict. Whereas Russia 
supported the two-state solution in the United Nations Security Council, Syria abstained from 
voting (Katz 2006: 1-4). Furthermore, the ties between Russia and Israel grew closer under 
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Putin. The two countries started to cooperate on a security level, and trade between Russia 
and Israel increased massively under Putin. The security cooperation between the two 
countries, concerned the Syrian government. Second, the economic relations between Russia 
and Syria became less tight. Syria still had to pay its debt to Russia, and Russia refused to sell 
Syria the weapons that it asked for (Katz 2006: 3). Russia and Syria were unable to resolve 
the debt issue.  
 However, this changed in 2005, when Bashar Al-Assad visited Moscow and they 
came to a solution to the debt issue. This solution was that “Moscow […] agreed to write off 
73 per cent of Syria‟s now 13,4 billion debt to Russia […] [and] Moscow allowed Damascus 
to repay the rest of the loan on terms extremely favorable to Syria: “The remaining $3,618 
billion will be paid off in installments, with Syria paying $170 million on the debt in 2005” 
(ibid, 4). This deal was also in favour of Russia, because Syria was not likely to repay the full 
debt in the future. Furthermore, the deal was highly beneficial for the Russian business sector, 
especially for the Russian arms, gas and oil industries. The deal increased trade between 
Russia and Syria, and made Syria more accessible for Russian businesses. However, its was 
not only economic beneficial, but also in in line with Putin‟s higher goal for Russia to become 
a great power.  
Apart from this deal, Syria saw Russia as a strategic partner against the United States 
(Katz 2006: 5). Katz (ibid, 7) explains Syria‟s anxiety of the United States by arguing that 
“the American-led intervention in Iraq and combined European and American pressure on 
Syria both to withdraw its forces from Lebanon and over the Hariri assassination have 
heightened Damascus‟s sense of insecurity, thus increasing its incentive to turn to Moscow.” 
This dependency on Russia, gives Putin a confortable position in Syria. Consequently, he is 
able to pursue its economic and political interests in Syria. Once again, this strategic 
partnership of Russia and Syria seems to confirm the realist theory. However, Putin‟s effort to 
counterweigh the United States and his confrontational way of acting towards the United 
States can also be understood from a constructivist perspective, which sees identities and 
structures as socially constructed. This can be best explained by looking at Russia‟s role in the 
Syria crisis.  
 
The Syria Crisis and Putin’s Endless Support Of Assad’s Regime 
The relationship between Syria and Russia became an important factor in the course of the 
Syria Crisis. Putin has supported Bashar al-Assad since the beginning of the Syria Crisis. 
With only the support of China in the United Nations Security Council, Putin vetoed four 
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UNSC Resolutions (UN, un.org). These resolutions were drawn to impose economic and 
military sanctions on the Syrian government, to stop the supply of weapons to Syria, to refer 
the Syrian conflict to the International Criminal Court and it would have even forced the 
Syrian government to step down (ibid).  
 Apart from supporting Assad‟s regime by vetoing these UNSC resolutions, Russia did 
not stop the supply of arms to Syria (Allison 2013: 35). Although there is an increasingly 
international pressure on Russia to stop its arms supply to Syria and to punish Assad, Russia 
keeps supporting its ally (Weir 2012). In order to show its support to Assad, Putin has visited 
Syria, and invited Assad to Moscow. Furthermore, Russia is not afraid to openly show its 
support to the Syrian government in the international community. Whereas the United States 
among other countries believed that the Syrian government used chemical weapons in 
Aleppo, Russian Foreign minister Sergei Lavrov stated in an interview with the Washington 
Times that he believed it were the rebels who had done it (Lavrov, youtube). Furthermore, he 
argues that the international community should not punish the Syrian government, or demand 
it to step down, but instead “it‟s only the Syrians themselves who can resolve and solve the 
problems of their country” (Lavrov, youtube). In 2013, Putin wrote “A Plea for Caution From 
Russia” to the New York Times in which he warns the United States to not take unilateral 
action in the form of military intervention in Syria (Putin).  
 At first, the answer to question of why Russia supports the Syrian government and 
Assad in particular so purposeful seems simple. Several scholars and newspapers see the 
following reasons as the most plausible reasons for Putin to support Assad. First, Russia and 
Syria are allies since the Cold War. As noted before, the Soviet Union and Syria had strong 
commercial, military and economic ties. Both Putin and Assad try to emphasize the fact that 
the relationship between the two countries knows a long history. During a visit to the Kremlin 
for example, Assad stated “We in Syria have never forgotten and never will forget the support 
that first the Soviet Union and then Russia gave us over all the years since we established 
diPalestinian Authoritymatic relations” (Assad, Kremlin Transcripts). Second, Russia has 
strong economic and political interests in the region. Russia has weapons contracts with Syria, 
which are worth more than 5 billion dollars (Weir). Russia is afraid to lose these contracts as a 
consequence of an overthrow of the Assad. Especially after Russia lost $4 billion dollar in 
Libya after Muammar Qaddafi was overthrown and murdered (ibid).  
Another, more strategic interest of Russia in Syria is the fact that Tartous is an 
important marine basis for Russia, and “the only port outside of the former where Russian 
ships enjoy unique anchoring privileges” (ibid). Another significant reason for Russia to 
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support Assad is that Russia is afraid that his regime will be replaced by an Islamist regime. 
Russia is anxious for Islamist threats that could spill over to the North Caucasus, or lead to 
instability in the Russian nation (Allison 2013: 809). Third, Russia does not want a western-
led intervention in Syria. Russia does not trust the intentions of the West. Furthermore, 
Lavrov (WP) states that the United States is not consistent in its statements and actions 
against states and individuals that violate the principles of the international law. He (Lavrov 
WP) argues that an individual can violate these principles as much he wants, as long as he is a 
partner of the United States.   
 These reasons to support Assad‟s regime seem legitimate, it is however important to 
understand on which interests these reasons are based. Although the strong bilateral 
relationship between Syria and Russia is seen as one of the main reasons for Putin to support 
Assad‟s regime, this relationship has not been effortless throughout history. Divergent 
interests between Russia and Syria have challenged their relationship several times. 
Therefore, Putin‟s strong support for Assad‟s government must be seen in his broader interest 
for Russia, which is to become a great power in international politics. The fact that Russia 
does not support a western-led intervention in Syria does not only show that Russia is anxious 
to lose power in the Middle East in favour of the Soviet Union, but it can also be seen as a 
way to legitimize its great power status in international relations. Furthermore, Russia wants 
to be considered a great power that follows the principles of the international law. By creating 
an image of the United States („the other‟), that has violated the principles of the international 
law, by taking unilateral actions without the support of the Security Council and acts interest 
driven, Russia creates an image of „the self‟, as a responsible great power, that does not want 
chaos in the Middle East. This idea of creating an image of „the self‟ by creating an image of 
„the other‟ confirms the constructivist idea that identities are socially constructed. Putin‟s 
open letter to the New York Times can be understood by this idea of socially constructed 
identities (Putin, NYT).  
 
Identity Formation Through an Open Letter 
On September 11, 2013, Putin wrote an open letter to the New York Times in which he 
confronted the United States with their position in the Syria Crisis. This letter seems to 
confirm several features of the realist theory. First, it seems to confirm that the international 
society is based on power relations between states. Putin confronts the United States for its 
actions, and demands the United States to follow the principles of the international law. Apart 
from the power relations between states, the letter can be seen, as a conformation of the idea 
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that we live in a world in which anarchy exists. In this anarchic structure, states are 
considered to be the highest authority. Furthermore, it seems to confirm the idea that the 
world is a self-help system, in which states are responsible for their own security and well-
being. This letter can be seen as an attempt of Putin to guarantee Russia‟s security and status 
in global politics.  
 However, upon closer examination, the realist conclusions that can be taken from this 
letter seem too shallow. Putin (ibid) makes a few statements in this letter that need further 
explanation. The constructivist perspective can give a better understanding of the origins of 
these statements. First, by writing this letter to the United States, Russia places itself next to 
the United States. Putin seems to show the world that the United States and Russia are equal 
powers in international politics. By mentioning the Cold War several times in his letter, Putin 
(ibid) even seems to create the idea of a bi-polar world. This is an example of how structures 
can be socially constructed. Second, by confronting the United States, Putin (ibid) creates an 
image of Russia. Moreover, Putin warns the United States for taking unilateral action against 
Syria. He (Putin, NYT) argues even that “millions around the world increasingly see America 
not as a model of democracy but as relying solely on brute force”. Herewith, Putin creates an 
image of the United States as an aggressive hegemon that is not willing to follow the 
principles of the international law. Overleaf, he creates an image of Russia as a responsible 
great power. This can be seen as an example of how identities are socially constructed. Third, 
Putin ask the United States to cooperate with Russia on critical issues in international affairs. 
From a realist perspective, the cooperation between Russia and the Soviet Union on several 
issues is difficult to explain. However, from a constructivist perspective, the cooperation 
could be explained from the idea that Russia wants to create an identity of a responsible great 
power, which includes cooperation with other „great powers‟.  
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CONCLUSION 
Relations between states are often described through a realist perspective. Realism is based on 
several assumptions about how states act and interact with each other. The realist theory 
assumes that structures, interests and identities are fixed. Furthermore, it assumes that we live 
in a world in which anarchy exists, and that states can only rely on themselves for their own 
security. Wendt (1992: 423) argues that “the meaning of structure for state action changes so 
slowly that it becomes a de facto parameter within which process takes place, then it may 
again be substantively appropriate to adopt the rationalist assumption that identities and 
interests are given”. However, by looking at Russia‟s foreign policy towards the Middle East, 
and what this tells us about how Russia tries to position itself in the world, the realist theory 
does not give us a thorough overview and understanding. The goal of this paper was therefore 
to give a more nuanced and enhanced understanding of Russia‟s position in the Middle East. 
It tried to do so by adapting the constructivist theory to this position.  
 First of all, in order to understand what the constructivist theory can offer in 
understanding the Russian position in the Middle East it is useful to understand the 
weaknesses of the realist theory in understanding this position. The main weakness of the 
realist theory is that it can only explain individual events. By looking at the position of Russia 
in the Middle East, the realist theory can give a good understanding of why Russia acted as it 
did. The effort of the Soviet Union and Russia under Putin to create strong ties with several 
Middle Eastern countries for example can be explained through the framework of „balance of 
power‟. Furthermore, the confrontational way of acting towards the United States seems to 
confirm this realist idea and even confirms the idea of an anarchic structure of the world-
system. The reason for these strong ties can be explained through the realist idea of „self-
help‟, in which states are responsible for their own safety. 
However, if we look at these events in a broader perspective, the realist theory gives a 
too limited view. For example, the realist theory does not give a clear understanding of why 
the changed structure of the world-system after the Cold War. It does not explain how the 
changed role of Russia domestically and in the world changed its identity and interests. 
Furthermore, the realist theory cannot explain the cooperation of the United States on 
different issues in the Middle East. 
 The constructivist theory can give a better understanding of how the Russian position 
in international politics and under Putin positions itself in the world. Whereas realism cannot 
explain the changing interests of Russia after the fall of the Soviet Union, constructivism 
explains this with the changing role of Russia that caused identity confusion. Furthermore, the 
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structure of the world system changed, which had an effect on the identity and interests of 
Russia.  
The constructivist theory can also help us to get a better understanding of Putin‟s 
foreign policy. The main goal of Putin is to become a key player in the world again. The 
Russian foreign policy towards the Middle East shows that Putin tries to become a key player 
through a process social interaction and identity formation. He tries to create an image of „a 
great power Russia‟ by constantly referring to the Soviet period. Furthermore, he creates an 
image of „the other‟ (United States) as an irresponsible, aggressive hegemon compared to the 
responsible „self‟ (Russia). By acting confrontational towards the United States, Putin creates 
the idea of a bi-polar world, in which the United States and Russia are equal powers. It is 
however questionable whether Russia can still be seen as a great power. Rumer & Wallander 
(2010, 57:60) for example argue that Russia is a power in weakness. They (ibid, 61) argue 
that “a large gap exists between Russian aspirations and images, on one hand, and the Russian 
ability to be one of the major pillar of the international system, on the other”. Furthermore, 
they argue that Russia‟s military and economic force is declining. However, as the 
constructivist theory states (Barnett 2011: 163), power cannot be measured only in material 
factors. Putin‟s social constructed identity of Russia as a „great power‟ seems to impress the 
world, and therefore legitimizes Russia‟s prominent role in international politics. Putin‟s 
foreign policy towards the Middle East can therefore be seen as part of a bigger plan of Putin 
to position Russia as one of the key players in world politics.  
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